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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Coltyne Conley entered a guilty plea to felony Aggravated Assault. The district court
sentenced him to five (5) years, with one (1) year fixed, and imposed that sentence. Mr. Conley
and the state had previously entered into a plea agreement wherein the prosecutor agreed to
recommend local jail time and probation, if Mr. Conley obtained a psychosexual evaluation, by a
specified evaluator, and he was evaluated to be a low-risk to re-offend. At the sentencing hearing,
the prosecutor acknowledged his obligation to follow the plea agreement and asked the district
court to follow the plea agreement. However, the prosecutor’s comments and arguments to the
district court impliedly disavowed the state’s promised sentence and breached the plea agreement.
The district court did not place Mr. Conley on probation. The district court imposed a prison
sentence of five (5) years, with the first year being fixed and gave him credit for two (2) days in
custody. Mr. Conley now appeals from his Judgment of Conviction, contending the prosecutor’s
statements and argument during the sentencing hearing breached the plea agreement and violated
his right to due process. Mr. Conley also contends that the district court abused its discretion by
imposing an excessive sentence. Mr. Conley asks for a new sentencing hearing before a different
judge.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Conley had no criminal history prior to the date of incident in the instant offense. (PSI,
pg. 5.) Aside from this conviction, his criminal history is limited to a misdemeanor conviction for
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resisting and obstructing, which occurred shortly after this case. (Tr., pg. 50, Ls. 1-18.; PSI, pg.
5.) The state filed an Information charged Mr. Conley with one count of Rape pursuant to Idaho
Code § 18-6101. (R., pg. 24.) Pursuant to plea negations, the state ultimately filed a Second
Amended Information that charged Mr. Conley with one count of Aggravated Assault, pursuant to
I.C. §§ 18-901(b) and 18-905(b), for the conduct of “putting a pillow over B.H.’s face causing
B.H. to have difficulty breathing.” (R., pp.77–78; Tr., pg. 5, L. 12 - pg. 6, L.13.) Pursuant to the
terms of the plea agreement with the state, Mr. Conley entered a guilty plea to the charge of
Aggravated Assault. (R., pp.87–88; Tr., p.15, L.17 – p.17, L.8.) Additionally, Mr. Conley was
required to obtain a psychosexual evaluation to be conducted by Dr. Engle or Dr. Johnston as part
of the plea agreement. (R., pp. 87-88; Tr., pg. 17, Ls. 9-14). In exchange, the State agreed to
recommend probation if the psychosexual evaluation came back as low risk. (R., pg. 87; Tr., pg.
7, Ls. 5-7; Tr., pg. 8, L. 24 – pg. 9, L.2.) Additionally, the state was not limited to recommend any
number of jail days, but the state would recommend that Mr. Conley have the option of work
release for any jail time asked for by the state in excess of thirty (30) days. (R., pg. 87; Tr., pg. 7,
L. 5 – pg. 8, L. 14.) Mr. Conley was free to argue for less. (R., pg., 87; Tr., pg. 8, Ls. 19-21.)
Mr. Conley obtained a psychosexual evaluation, conducted by Dr. Johnston, that was
included in the presentence investigation (“PSI”). (PSI, pp. 25-65.) The psychosexual evaluation
determined Mr. Conley was a low risk, this information was reflected in the PSI. (PSI, pg. 13.)
Mr. Conley’s Level of Service Inventory-Revised score also placed him in the low risk category.
(PSI, pg. 12.) The PSI also reflected that there were eleven (11) offenders in the sentencing
database that had similar factors as Mr. Conley. (PSI, pg. 13.) The sentencing database reflected
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that seven (7) of those offenders were sentenced to probation and four (4) of those offenders we
sentenced to retained jurisdiction. (PSI, pg. 13.) The PSI recommended probation, specifically that
Mr. Conley “could be successful in the community under supervision.” (PSI, pg. 14.)
At the outset of the sentencing hearing, the district court stated that the plea agreement
called for the state to cap its recommendation a probation, if the psychosexual evaluation returned
as low risk, which it did. (Tr., pg. 19, Ls. 10-15.) Further, that the state had the right to argue the
number of jail days, but that the agreement was that the state would not recommend that any more
than thirty (30) days be served without options. (Tr., pg. 19, Ls. 16-20.) At the outset of the
prosecutor’s sentencing argument the prosecutor asked that the district court follow the plea
agreement and recommended 365 days in jail, with the first thirty (30) days to be served forthwith
with no options. (Tr., pg. 36, Ls. 14 -19.) Notably, the prosecutor did not use the word probation
a single time during the entirety of his sentencing argument. (Tr., pg. 36, L. 14 – pg. 46, L. 12.)
The state additionally made a number of inflammatory statements and remarks. For
example, the prosecutor described defense actions in the case as an attempt to “harass” the victim.
(Tr., pg. 27, Ls. 22-24; Tr., pg. 38, L. 2.) He described letters of support written by Mr. Conley’s
mother and stepfather as “offensive and victim-blaming,” suggested that the content of those letters
“likely came from him,” and argued that Mr. Conley had “told a lot of people untrue versions of
what happened, which further victimizes [the victim].” (Tr., pg. 41, Ls. 6-13.) The prosecutor also
described Mr. Conley’s response to the PSI investigator’s inquiry as to whether he had a criminal
history prior to this incident as “dishonest in the PSI, not telling them about his other criminal
conviction, actually having the gall to say ‘I have never actually been in trouble.’” (Tr., pg. 41, Ls.
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14-17.) The prosecutor characterized Mr. Conley’s statement regarding his plans to avoid future
legal trouble as “really nothing more than just blatant victim blaming.” (Tr., pg. 41, Ls. 22-24.)
The prosecutor personally attacked Mr. Conley repeatedly. He stated “in the beginning, he
flat out lied over and over.” (Tr., pg. 39, Ls. 11-12.) He called Mr. Conley’s apology “false.” (Tr.,
pg. 42, Ls. 11-12.) Despite the psychosexual evaluation coming back low risk, the prosecutor
argued that Mr. Conley tried to skew the results. (Tr., pg. 43, Ls. 10 – 20.) The prosecutor described
Mr. Conley as “unsympathetic, impulsive, and hostile.” (Tr., pg. 43, Ls. 17-18.) He described Mr.
Conley’s statements during the psychosexual evaluation as “terrifying” and “dangerous” and said
“[i]f that is true, nobody would be safe from him, so I hope he is simply lying to make himself
look good.” (Tr., pg. 44, 1-13.) The prosecutor discussed the set over of the first sentencing hearing
as he described that the victim was “absolutely traumatized” as result, and he sat with her for about
45 minutes as she cried. (Tr., pg. 36, L. 22 – pg. 37, L. 4.) The prosecutor referred to the two victim
impact statements submitted by the victim and continued to repeatedly emphasize the content of
those statements to the district court. (Tr., pg. 45, Ls. 2-25.)
Following the state’s argument and recommendation, Mr. Conley’s counsel objected to the
prosecutor’s argument. (Tr., pg. 46, L. 15 – pg. 47, L. 4; Tr., pg. 62, Ls. 13-21.) Conley’s counsel
stated that the prosecutor had offered to resolve the case as an aggravated assault from the
preliminary hearing stage, which was indicative of a number of issues with the state’s case. (Tr.,
pg. 54, L. 15 – pg. 55, L. 10.) Mr. Conley’s counsel also noted that the case as originally charged
by the state would have been “extremely problematic” for the prosecution at trial and pointed out
numerous facts that supported that proposition. (Tr., pg. 56, L. 15 – pg. 58, L. 4.) Mr. Conley’s
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counsel also argued there had not been a single incident of contact with, or harassment of, the
victim during the pendency of the case. (Tr., pg. 47, L. 14 – pg. 48, L. 8.)
Mr. Conley’s counsel also noted concern with the prosecutor’s characterization that the
defense investigation of the case should be attributed to, or considered for, the purposes of
punishment as defendants do not generally have the financial resources of the prosecutor’s office
and the police. (Tr., pg. 48, Ls. 8 – 23; see also Tr., pg. 56, Ls. 3-14; Tr. pg. 58, Ls. 5 – 24.) His
counsel further commented that the defense had been blind-sided by the prosecutor’s notification
to the defense the day before the original sentencing hearing that restitution would be sought for
emergency room visits that occurred nine (9) or more months after this incident. (Tr., pg. 48, L.
24 – pg. 49, L. 16.) Mr. Conley’s counsel argued to the court Mr. Conley was an appropriate
candidate for probation based on the PSI and psychosexual evaluation. (Tr., pg. 61, Ls. 13 – 22.)
Mr. Conley’s counsel stated that the prosecutor’s argument implied that the plea agreement should
be disregarded. (Tr., pg. 62, Ls. 13-21.)
Mr. Conley also had a number of protective factors that would be a deterrence for any
future criminal conduct. (Tr., pg. 63, L. 16 – pg. 64, L. 22; See also PSI, pg. 13; PSI, pg. 14.) Mr.
Conley expressed remorse for his actions and the impact of his actions on the victim. (PSI, pg. 12;
PSI, pg. 14; Tr., pg. 68, L. 11- pg. 69, L. 13.) The district court sentenced Mr. Conley to an
aggregate term of (5) five years, with one (1) year fixed, and imposed that sentence. (R., pg. 96 99; Tr., pg. 78, Ls. 1-17.) Mr. Conley filed a timely notice of appeal from the district court’s
Judgment of Conviction and Order of Commitment. (R., pp. 109 - 113.)
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ISSUES
1.

Did the state breach the plea agreement by making statements that impliedly disavowing
its promised sentencing recommendation?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of five years,
with one year fixed, upon Mr. Conley, following his guilty plea to Aggravated Assault?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The State Breached The Plea Agreement By Making Statements During Argument That
Unequivocally Conflicted With The Sentencing Recommendation The State Was Required To
Recommend
A. Introduction
In exchange for a plea of guilty, the defendant is entitled to rely on the on the promise of
the state to make a certain recommendation at the sentencing hearing. It is impermissible for a
prosecutor to make statements during the sentencing argument that unequivocally conflict with the
prosecutor’s recommendation. The prosecutor was required to make a recommendation for
probation if the psychosexual evaluation came back low risk. (R., p. 87; Tr., pg. 7, Ls. 5-7; Tr., pg.
8, L. 24 – pg. 9, L.2.) The prosecutor’s statements at Mr. Conley’s sentencing hearing categorically
departed from the probation recommendation that the prosecutor was required to make. In fact, the
prosecutor only asked that the court follow the plea agreement and launched into an argument in
which he did not give a single reason why Mr. Conley was an appropriate candidate for probation.
The prosecutor never even used the word “probation” during his sentencing argument. The
prosecutor’s statements fundamentally and unequivocally departed from the recommendation the
prosecutor was required to make pursuant to the plea bargain. This constituted a breach of the plea
agreement and deprived Mr. Conley of the benefit of his plea bargain.
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B. Standard of Review
The determination as to whether the prosecutor breached the plea agreement in this case is
a question of law that is to be reviewed by this Court de novo, in accordance with contract law
standards. State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 255 (2012) (citing State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 595
(2010).
Mr. Conley’s counsel objected to the prosecutor’s statements in the district court and
specifically stated that the objection was to preserve the issue for appeal. (Tr., pg. 46, L. 15 – pg.
47, L. 4; see also Tr., pg. 62, Ls. 13 -21.) When there is no objection to the alleged breach of the
plea agreement, the defendant may raise the issue for the first time on appeal under the fundamental
error standard. State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho 71, 74 (2005); State v. Halbesleben, 147 Idaho 161, 16465 (Ct. App. 2009); State v. Wills, 140 Idaho 773, 775 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Daubs, 140 Idaho
299, 300 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Jones, 139 Idaho 299, 301 (Ct. App. 2003). However, if “a
constitutional violation occurs at trial, and is followed by a contemporaneous objection, a reversal
is necessitated, unless the state proves ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did
not contribute to the verdict obtained,’” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221 (2010) (quoting
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).
The Chapman harmless error test was further extended to apply to all objected-to error. Id.
The grounds for an objection must be clearly stated or the basis of the objection must be apparent
from the context in order to preserve the issue for appeal. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 277
(2003) (citing State v. Norton, 134 Idaho 875, 880 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. Cannady, 137 Idaho
67, 72 (2001)). A timely objection must be posed in response to the alleged improper statements
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and the best practice in criminal cases is for such an objection to be made at the earliest
opportunity. State v. Camp, 107 Idaho 36, 38 (Ct. App. 1984). In this case, Mr. Conley’s counsel
objected to the state’s argument at sentencing at the outset of her sentencing argument and
subsequently reiterated the issue again. (Tr., pg. 46, L. 15 – pg., 47 L. 4; Tr., pg. 62, Ls. 13-21.)
Therefore, this issue is reviewed under the harmless error standard.
C. The Prosecutor Breached The Plea Agreement By Making Statements That Were
Fundamentally At Odds With The Sentence The Prosecutor Was Mandated To Recommend
It is mandated that “when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement
of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise
must be fulfilled.” Gomez, 153 Idaho at 255 (citing State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 595 (2010)).
Importantly, “this principle is derived from the Due Process Clause and the fundamental rule that,
to be valid, a guilty plea must be both voluntary and intelligent.” Halbesleben, 147 Idaho at 165
(citing Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508–09 (1984); State v. Rutherford, 107 Idaho 910, 913
(Ct. App. 1985)). “If the prosecution has breached its promise given in a plea agreement, whether
that breach was intentional or inadvertent, it cannot be said that the defendant’s plea was knowing
and voluntary, for the defendant has been led to plead guilty on a false premise.” Id. A breach of
a plea agreement “goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant’s rights” because it affects whether
the plea agreement was entered into knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Jafek, 141 Idaho at
74 (citing State v. Knowlton, 123 Idaho 916, 918 (1993)).
A prosecutor is not required to recommend a sentence enthusiastically. Jones, 139 Idaho
at 302 (citations omitted). However, a prosecutor is prohibited from circumventing a plea
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agreement through words or actions that convey reservation about the recommendation or implied
disavowing the recommendation. Id. A prosecutor is not required to use a certain form of
expression when making a sentencing recommendation, but “their overall conduct must be
reasonably consistent with making such a recommendation, rather than the reverse.” Halbesleben,
147 Idaho at 165 (citing Jones, 139 Idaho at 302) .
In State v. Lankford, the prosecutor described the defendant as “manipulative, dishonest,
and dangerous.” 127 Idaho 608, 617 (1995)). In Jones, the prosecutor described the case as “one
of the most disturbing” she had ever dealt with. 139 Idaho at 300-01. The prosecutor also
emphasized the violence of the offense, the defendant’s history of violence, and the defendant’s
refusal to accept responsibility. Id. at 301. There, the Court of Appeals held that the prosecutor
had violated the plea agreement because her statements during her sentencing argument were
“fundamentally at odds” with the sentencing recommendation she had promised to make. Id. at
303 (quoting Lankford, 127 Idaho at 617). The Court of Appeals concluded that the prosecutor had
“uttered the recommendation required by the plea agreement,” but she had disavowed the
recommendation and advocated for a harsher recommendation through her other statements. Id.
The Court of Appeals held that Jones had not received the benefit of the plea bargain, vacated his
sentence, and remanded his case for resentencing before a different judge. Id.
Further, in Daubs, the Court of Appeals held that it was an error for the prosecutor to
“emphasize” the prison recommendation in the PSI and “embellish” the victim impact statements
made by the victim’s parents when the prosecutor had agreed to make a rider recommendation.
140 Idaho at 301. Additionally, the prosecutor should not provide vigorous argument that is
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inconsistent with the sentence recommendation the prosecutor agreed to make. Wills, 140 Idaho at
775-76. In Wills, the prosecutor specified that the recommended sentence was the “minimum” that
the court should impose, described the recommendation as one made with “great restraint,” and
described the defendant as a “predator” with a high risk of reoffending. Id. at 774. As a result, the
Court of Appeals held that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement because the prosecutor’s
sentencing recommendation was undermined by the prosecutor’s argument at the sentencing
hearing. Id. at 776. Accordingly, the defendant’s sentence was also vacated and his case remanded
for resentencing by a different judge. Id.
Here, the prosecutor completely disavowed the plea agreement. Through the entirety of his
argument, the prosecutor did not ever use the word “probation.” (Tr., pg. 36, L. 14 – pg. 46, L.
12.) At the outset and tail end of the prosecutor’s argument, he only asked the court to “follow the
plea agreement.” (Tr., pg. 36, L. 15; Tr., pg. 46 Ls. 10-11.) The prosecutor did not give a single
reason why Mr. Conley was an appropriate candidate for probation or why the state agreed to
recommend probation pursuant to the plea agreement. (Tr., pg. 36, L. 14 – pg. 46, L. 12.) The
prosecutor did not articulate why the state had offered to resolve the case as an Aggravated Assault.
The prosecutor failed to state that Mr. Conley had no criminal history prior to this incident. The
prosecutor’s references to the PSI and psychosexual evaluation minimized the fact that Mr. Conley
was deemed to be a good candidate for probation and posed a low-risk to reoffend. (Tr., pg. 41, L.
14 – pg. 42, L. 7; Tr., pg. 42, L. 13 – pg. 44, L. 23.)
Further, the prosecutor repeatedly emphasized highly disputed conduct that Mr. Conley
had not pled guilty to during his argument. (Tr., pg. 38, L. 11 – pg. 41, L. 5.) The prosecutor used
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repeatedly used inflammatory language like “dishonest,” engaging in “victim blaming,”
“terrifying,” “lying,” “dangerous,” “unsympathetic,” “impulsive,” and “hostile” to describe Mr.
Conley and his actions (Tr., pg. 41, Ls. 14 -24; Tr., pg. 43, Ls. 3-18; Tr., pg. 44, Ls. 3-10.) The
prosecutor also departed from the plea agreement by stating “if that is true, nobody would be safe
from him, so I hope he is simply lying to make himself look good.” (Tr., pg. 44, Ls. 11-13.) The
prosecutor criticized letters of support from Mr. Conley’s family as “offensive and victimblaming.” (Tr., pg. 41, Ls. 6-8.) He described the defense of Mr. Conley’s case as an attempt to
“harass my victim or to try to take the focus off of what actually happened in January of last year.”
(Tr., pg. 37, L. 23 – pg. 38, L. 4.) Further, the prosecutor referred to the victim impact statements
and the demeanor of the victim in court and drew the court’s attention to them in a manner that
completely departed from the plea agreement. (Tr., pg. 45, L. 2 – pg. 46, L. 7.) The court
specifically addressed the “very distressing, concerning information as to how this event has
affected [the victim]” before Mr. Conley’s sentence was pronounced. (Tr., pg. 76, Ls. 19 – 21.)
The court also stated that “the fact that it presents such risk of emotional damage to the victim is
what makes it so terribly wrong and what makes it so worthy of punishment.” (Tr., pg. 77, Ls. 6 –
9.)
In this case, the prosecutor’s conduct and statements were not consistent with the state’s
promise pursuant to the plea agreement to recommend probation. The prosecutor asked the court
to follow the plea agreement. However, the prosecutor absolutely disavowed the state’s obligation
to recommend probation by making statements that advocated for a much harsher sentence.
Accordingly, Mr. Conley respectfully requests that this Court conclude that the state breached the
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plea agreement by failing to fulfill its side of the bargain. Mr. Conley respectfully requests that the
Court vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing before a different judge.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Five Years,
With One Year Fixed, Upon Mr. Conley, Following His Guilty Plea To Aggravated Assault
The district court imposed a sentence of five years, with one year fixed. Mr. Conley’s
sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum. The evaluation as to whether a sentence is
excessive is evaluated under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8
(2015) (citing State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)). “It is well-established that ‘[w]here a
sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of
discretion on the part of the court imposing the sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010)
(quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (internal citation omitted)). To establish that
the sentence imposed was unreasonable, Mr. Conley “must show that the sentence, in light of the
governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho
457, 460 (2002). The factors considered are protection of society, deterrence of the defendant and
of others, the possibility of rehabilitation, and punishment or retribution of the defendant. Id. at
460-61 (quoting State v. Howard, 135 Idaho 727 (2001)).
Mr. Conley asserts that the district court should have sentenced him to a lesser term of
imprisonment or probation in light of the mitigating factors. The district court specified that there
were mitigating factors to consider. (Tr., pg. 75, Ls. 19-20.) Specifically, that Mr. Conley had a
“limited criminal history,” that he was not someone that had “ongoing criminal tendencies,” he
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was “well liked and respected” by a lot of people, and he was evaluated as a “low risk to re-offend.”
(Tr., pg. 75, L. 21 – pg. 76, L. 5.) The district court indicated that these things “suggest that [Mr.
Conley] ultimately is someone who can refrain from engaging in like behavior in the future, that
he could generally conform himself to the law, and that he can do productive things in the
community.” (Tr., pg. 76, Ls. 5 – 10.) However, the district court determined that a sentence other
than prison would “depreciate the seriousness of the offense.” (Tr., pg. 77, Ls. 22-25.)
However, Mr. Conley was evaluated as a low risk to re-offend by the PSI and the
psychosexual evaluation. (PSI, pg. 14.) Pursuant to the sentencing database information contained
in the PSI, no other offender who met similar criteria to Mr. Conley has received a prison sentence.
(PSI, pg. 13.) Mr. Conley expressed remorse for his actions and understood the gravity of his
offense. (PSI, pg. 14; Tr., pg. 68, L. 1 – pg. 69, L. 13.) Further, Mr. Conley has the foundation and
resources to succeed on probation. The PSI listed Mr. Conley’s support system, accommodations,
financial stability and good use of time as protective factors. (PSI, pg. 13.) Accordingly, the district
court’s sentence was unreasonable because it was not necessary for the protection of society or to
accomplish the other objectives of criminal sentences. Jail time followed by probation would have
achieved these objectives by providing an opportunity for rehabilitation under strict supervision in
the community, as well as punishment and deterrence.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Conley respectfully requests that this Court vacate his sentence and remand his case
for a new sentencing hearing before a different district judge with instructions that the state
recommend a sentence that strictly adheres to the plea agreement. Alternatively, he respectfully
requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.

DATED this 15th day of June, 2018.

_________________________
EDWINA E. WAGER
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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